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Abstract 
Retirement system sustainability is defined as the ability of plan boards and managers to be responsible 
investors, active stewards, and allocators of capital to economic activities with desirable social and 
environmental outcomes. In this paper, we examine the policy frameworks and important structural 
variables pertinent to private retirement systems in Australia, the UK, and the US. By analyzing various 
reports, interviewing experts, and using data from the Principles of Responsible Investment as well as 
national pension and retirement authorities, we identify key structural challenges within national 
retirement systems. These include market fragmentation, principal-agent conflicts in personal pensions, 
and the role of service providers. Our results provide insight into how, or whether, retirement systems can 
facilitate desirable economic, social, and environmental outcomes. 
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Aligning the financial system with the real economy is necessary for society to address 
urgent sustainability challenges, including the climate crisis and economic inequality. Connecting 
the financial system and the real economy requires the alignment of financial policy and regulation 
with sustainability objectives and frameworks, along with the consideration of market structure. 
The aim of this study is to understand the policy frameworks and important structural variables—
fund concentration, number and types of actors, and relative market power—specifically for 
private retirement systems in Australia, the UK and the US.1 Private retirement systems are among 
the largest pools of long-term capital globally, and the three selected countries are those with most 
total assets. By reviewing policy and structure, we sought to better understand the behaviour of 
various actors, their key challenges, retirement systems functioning, and the ability of the system 
to align with sustainability objectives (for example human rights or net-zero policy commitments). 
We therefore define retirement system sustainability as the ability of plan boards and managers to 
be responsible investors, active stewards, and allocators of capital to economic activities with 
desirable social and environmental outcomes. Systemic sustainability issues such as the climate 
crisis and economic inequality hold the potential for environmental and economic destruction, 
devastation of livelihoods, and political upheaval and conflict with clear negative implications for 
global financial markets. Pension fund members face risk both of a financial nature and in relation 
to quality of life in retirement. In order to tackle these issues, we need to redirect capital flows and 
ensure that assets are stewarded to align economic activities with science-based thresholds and 
commitments. Pension systems should be designed to fulfil a central part of this sustainability 
realignment in the interest of their members. 
In recent years, there has been an upsurge in Environmental, Social, and Governance 
(ESG), climate, and sustainable policies (PRI 2021) and related regulations (Eskander et al. 2021). 
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These policies have not only grown in numbers, but they are also becoming increasingly detailed. 
For example, the European Union (EU) Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR) has 
recently introduced requirements for financial service firms (at both entity and product-level) to 
document, on a ‘comply or explain’ basis, how they consider sustainability risks in their 
investment decision-making and how their decisions influence sustainability factors. The SFDR 
(2019) includes a reference to the EU Taxonomy Regulation, requiring financial institutions to 
document the extent to which they use the taxonomy to determine the sustainability of their 
products and the degree to which they are aligned. The taxonomy sets performance thresholds for 
specific economic activities to determine the extent to which they make a substantial contribution 
to environmental objectives within the EU while avoiding significant harm to other environmental 
objectives (PRI 2020a). Other major capital markets such as Canada, China, and the UK have 
already developed, or are in the process of developing, similar taxonomies. Such policy 
frameworks designed to deliver both sustainability objectives—such as net-zero emissions—and 
market stability by aiming to redirect capital to sustainable economic activities and promote active 
stewardship of asset owners (e.g., pension funds), although it is not clear whether and when 
retirement system designs serve as obstacles or accelerators of these policies.  
Policy frameworks vary across the three jurisdictions examined. The design of 
conventional retirement and pension policy has implications for the sustainability of private 
retirement systems. Whether it is policymakers encouraging fund consolidation, tightening of 
solvency requirements, automatic enrolment legislation, or measures to protect consumers and 
savers from excessive costs, policy instruments influence asset pools, as well as governance and 
investment activities regarding sustainability. Currently, the US retirement system is generally 
subject to a more market-led approach, whereas Australian and UK policymakers have played a 
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more active role. UK policymakers have been particularly proactive, recently introducing new 
requirements for consideration of ESG factors by retirement plans, including stewardship. 
Australian policymakers have been the most forceful in driving fund consolidation in the private 
retirement system. However, they have not put sustainability at the core of policymaking. 
Our research gathers quantitative and qualitative data from various national pension and 
retirement authorities, consultants, think tanks, and investment industry organisations; reviews 
related literature, policy, and regulatory documents; and includes interviews with experts and 
practitioners across the three countries. We identify three key issues: 1) market fragmentation, 
which tends to undermine the responsible investment support and activities among retirement 
plans; 2) the increasing importance of fund managers and investment consultants, along with their 
limited responsible investment incentives; and 3) the growth in personal pensions systems which 
have tended to lack emphasis on sustainability.  
Our research shows, first, that public sector retirement plans generally benefit more from 
economies of scale. Larger plans with greater assets under management generally tend to have 
more market power (i.e., ability to influence services and products in the market), stronger 
governance, and, in some cases, internal investment expertise. As the degree of cross-sectional 
ownership of the economy—through diversified, global and long-term portfolios—is higher, large 
asset owners have an increased interest in reducing market risk and externalities presented by 
sustainability challenges to improve financial performance overall. In its most developed form, 
this is commonly referred to as universal ownership. From a system perspective, if we use PRI 
membership2 as a proxy, our findings suggest that when the number of asset owners with scale in 
the system is low, the system-wide consideration of sustainability challenges is also low. At the 
same time, we find that other segments of the retirement system with very high fragmentation in 
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terms of assets, often showcase potential shortcomings such as weak governance, insufficient 
investment expertise and resources, investment chain complexity, and principal-agent issues. 
Overall, fragmented systems face the greatest challenges in developing sustainable investment 
practices.  
Second, we show that the weight of capital and influence of actors in private retirement 
systems has shifted away from institutional asset owners undertaking investment strategy, asset 
allocation, and manager selection on behalf of beneficiaries, towards financial service providers, 
who have assigned responsibility to individuals to determine their own investment strategies. As 
a consequence, we find that most retirement plans rely heavily on the fund management and 
investment consulting industries in the formulation and execution of their investment strategies. 
Both industries are dominated by a relatively small number of firms with significant asset 
concentration. Accordingly, while their market power and resources could, in theory, imply that 
that they would be best situated to drive responsible investment and stewardship, in practice their 
lack of incentives results in limited execution.  
Last, we examine personal pension savings which currently total $12 trillion, the fastest 
growing segments of the three countries examined. Here we find that individual savers are faced 
with complex choices that they are generally ill-equipped to make, and therefore they must often 
rely on independent financial advisers where cost, a more comprehensible metric than value or 
quality, is often the focus. For this reason, sustainability is often not considered, despite increasing 
interest. We also find the data in personal pension markets to be insufficient to draw a complete 
picture in terms of market share and product uptake. While the general lack of transparency limits 
the insights we generate on firms and products, we conclude that the structural challenges and lack 
of market focus hinder sustainability in this large and growing market. 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We first discuss our methodology and 
data collection process. Next, we report main findings focusing on market fragmentation, the role 
of service providers, and principal-agent conflicts in personal pensions. A final section concludes.  
 
Prior Related Literature 
Our research is broadly related to the emerging literature on sustainable finance. To date, 
prior work has documented a range of institutional investor specific responsible investment (RI) 
developments, including ESG investment allocation (Gibson & Krueger 2018; Gibson et al. 2021), 
proxy voting (Bolton et al. 2020; He et al. 2020), and engagement (Dimson et al. 2015; Dimson et 
al. 2020; Hoepner et al. 2021). In addition, there is a growing understanding that client interest in 
these issues is on the upswing as well (Hartzmark & Sussman 2019; Bauer & Smeets forthcoming; 
Riedl & Smeets 2017). Nevertheless, we have identified very few studies that concentrate on 
pension system structures specifically and the institutional investors therein. While there are useful 
broader analyses (OECD 2017, 2020), we have not found related literature examining how 
jurisdictional characteristics influence the ESG integration practices of these institutional actors, 
or whether client interests are served differentially across these jurisdictions. This is most likely 
due to data limitations, as few datasets exist that enable analysis of client demand and jurisdictional 
characteristics by design. We therefore complement the literature by adopting a mixed-methods 
approach to examining these gaps and opportunities for research. 
 
Methodology and Data  
The first phase of this research focused on obtaining and analysing data on retirement plans, 
assets and members from various national pension and retirement authorities, pension and 
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investment consultants, think tanks, pension trade press as well as investment industry 
organisations. Sources reviewed included the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, the 
Productivity Commission, the Royal Commission, the Responsible Investment Association 
Australasia, QMV and the Financial Services Council in Australia; The Pension Regulator, the 
Financial Conduct Authority, the Department of Workers and Pensions, ShareAction and the 
Pension Protection Fund in the UK; Influence Map, the Employee Benefit Research Institute, the 
Employee Benefits Security Administration, the Investment Company Institute, the Milliman 
Corporate Pension Funding Study and Callan in the US; and global sources such as Willis Tower 
Watson’s Global Pension Assets study and the 500 Largest Asset Managers study, the Melbourne 
Mercer Global Pension Index, and the PRI signatory database (see Appendix Table A1 for 
additional details on these sources). 
We furthermore reviewed academic literature and policy and regulatory documents and 
conducted interviews with a range of experts and practitioners. To validate the research, we also 
sought input from selected pension experts and academics on each of the markets examined. These 
included leading thinkers with decades of experience in pension policy and practice from 
governments, academia, think tanks, and industry, across the three countries examined. Our 
findings reflect the feedback received and verify many of our generated insights.  
 
Main Findings  
It is important to recognise the idiosyncratic characteristics of the retirement systems 
examined. Each system is a construction of different policies and various features—defined 
contributions (DC) and/or defined benefit (DB), single-employer and/or multi-employer or 
industry, public and/or private sector, for-profit and/or not-for-profit—and while many of the 
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building blocks are the same, the unique combination of these policies and features makes 
quantitative comparison challenging. We are aware of these analytical constraints and therefore 
complement the quantitative methods with qualitative assessment and comparative commentary. 
Market Fragmentation. In this sub-section, we examine the role of market fragmentation for 
private retirement system sustainability. We collected and analyzed 2019 data from national 
retirement and pension agencies, regulators, and industry associations, and we find that there is 
significant variation in asset fragmentation levels both across countries as well as within pension 
systems. In Table 1, we show, that the scale in terms of assets (indicated through average plan 
size) of public and industry retirement plans such as not-for-profit superannuation funds in 
Australia (average size of $12bn), local government pension schemes (LGPS) in the UK ($22.5bn), 
and public defined benefit (DB) plans in the US ($35bn) exhibit significantly more scale in terms 
of assets than other segments such as US 401(k) plans ($0.01bn), private sector DB plans in the 
US ($.07bn) and in the UK ($0.39bn), and workplace DC trust schemes in the UK ($0.05bn). 
Unsurprisingly, the private sector segments (both DB and DC), which are often single-employer 
plans, are quite fragmented parts of the systems in asset terms, meaning that these segments include 
a very high number of plans (e.g., there are 560,000 401(k) plans in the US), many of which are 
small. By using PRI membership as a proxy for support of responsible investment, we find that 
the most fragmented segments of each national retirement system have the lowest PRI coverage 
in asset terms: 401(k) plans (<1%) and private sector DB plans (0%) in the US, and private sector 
DB and DC plans in the UK (18%).3 This suggests that fragmented segments have very low levels 
of support for responsible investment.  
Table 1 here 
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Over time, the weight of capital and influence of actors in private retirement systems has 
shifted away from institutional asset owners that undertake investment strategy, asset allocation, 
and manager selection, on behalf of beneficiaries. Increasingly, influence has shifted towards 
financial service providers, who have assigned responsibility to individuals to determine their own 
investment strategies. In the US, this is indicated by total asset size and 5-year compound annual 
growth rate (CAGR) figures for Independent Retirement Accounts (IRAs) (total assets equal 
$11trn and 5-year CAGR is 8.6%), and 401(k) plans ($6.2trn and 7.1%). The story in Australia is 
somewhat different, with not-for-profit superannuation funds being the dominating type of pension 
provision with $895bn in total assets and 5-year CAGR at 11.7 percent. Nonetheless, self-managed 
superannuation funds, the personal pension vehicle in Australia, amount to more than 25 percent 
of total retirement system assets. In the UK, the picture is less clear, with LGPS only accounting 
for $450bn in total assets but a high 5-year CAGR of 9.8 percent, private sector workplace DB 
plans are the largest segment accounting for more than $2trn and 5-year CAGR of 7.7 percent. 
Data are not available to calculate 5-year CAGR for either workplace DC contract schemes or 
personal pensions. 
In essence, we find significant asset fragmentation within the three retirement systems. 
This is most noticeable in private sector segments, as indicated by average plan sizes above. 
Generally speaking, small plans tend to be less engaged with sustainable investment as indicated 
by PRI membership figures. In Table 2, we see the results at the national retirement system level. 
The UK and US systems, both of which include large, fragmented private sector, single-employer 
segments, have considerably lower PRI membership ratios than Australia. Additionally, if we 
include the personal pension assets in the equation, where IRAs in the US make up the largest 
share (36.7% of total US retirement assets), the contrast is even more stark. This complements a 
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previous finding that larger plans are generally more engaged with sustainable investment (PRI, 
2019). 
Table 2 here 
As Table 2 shows, DB remains a large share of private retirement pools, accounting for 
$17.4 trillion in assets across the three nations examined here. In the UK and US, many private 
sector DB plans are already closed to new members (88% and 25% in the UK and US, 
respectively), and more plans are now closed to new accruals (41% and 12% respectively) (PRI 
2020b). With the notable exception of a small number of UK private sector workplace DB plans, 
there has been limited leadership on sustainability in the DB segment as indicated by the PRI 
membership ratios. We also find that with sponsors and trustees focused on liabilities and de-
risking, sustainability has become even less of a priority. Therefore, in the absence of regulatory 
intervention or determined action by trustees and sponsors, private workplace DB plans are 
unlikely to be major providers of new sustainable capital going forward. 
The governance set-up of private sector workplace DB plans also reveals some challenges. 
Sponsors in the UK and US routinely establish governing bodies that take on responsibility for 
managing and administering the plans. In the UK, the governing body is comprised of independent 
trustees required to act impartially and in members’ best interests. In the US, the equivalent is a 
plan fiduciary, who is typically a corporate officer. The trustee/fiduciary is the ultimate steward of 
the assets and of beneficiaries’ interests. The sponsor remains ultimately responsible for making 
up any shortfall in the plan’s funding, so it has a continuing interest in the investment strategy. In 
the UK, trustees have the final say on investments, but in the US, given the dual role of fiduciaries 
and potential absence of impartiality, the lines are less clear. Figures 1 and 2 below illustrate the 
differences between the two models and reveal a complex structure of advisors (actuaries and 
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consultants), administrators, and asset managers in both countries. Overall, the structure and 
governance setup leave private sector DB plans with limited influence on the complex 
intermediation chain, i.e. as Figures 1 and 2 illustrate, the investment chain has multiple entities 
involved in both investment strategy and execution.  
Figures 1 and 2 here 
The picture is similar for US 401(k) plans where there is also a relatively long chain of 
intermediaries—as shown in Figure 3—between the ultimate owner of the invested assets of a 
401(k) plan—the employee—and the actual investment decision. Plan sponsors are ultimately 
responsible for the design and operation of the plan. They usually use third-party trustees and 
recordkeepers for day-to-day operations, relying on external advisers in choosing the provider and 
determining the investment line-up. As plan participants are increasingly enrolled into a default 
option, termed in the US a Qualified Default Investment Alternative (QDIA), the selection of the 
default asset manager—and, where the QDIA is a Target Date Fund or a balanced fund, that 
manager’s selection of underlying instruments—will be the primary determinant of how DC assets 
are invested.4 As our interviews indicated, this complex intermediation chain increases the risk of 
beneficiary or plan preferences on sustainability not being expressed in investment decisions or 
proxy voting behavior. It is also important to note that the current language of the US Labor 
Department’s Employee Benefits Security Administration’s (EBSA) 2018 Field Assistance 
Bulletin leaves fiduciaries reluctant to deviate from peers to avoid litigation risk. Overall, 
regulatory signals, structural barriers, and governance challenges leave 401(k) plans with limited 
scope to address sustainability issues.  
Figure 3 here 
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The Role of Service Providers. To examine the role of service providers in private retirement 
system sustainability, we review data from P&I The Largest Money Managers (US, May 2019), 
IPE (UK, August 2019), Australian Managed Funds Industry, FSC/Morningstar (July 2016), PRI 
signatory database (April 2020), and Willis Towers Watson The World’s Largest 500 Asset 
Managers (2019); see Appendix Table A1. We find that there is considerable asset concentration 
among the largest asset managers in all three countries. Thus, Table 3 shows that the top 10 asset 
managers in Australia hold 50 percent of externally managed retirement assets. In the US, the top 
10 asset managers for DB funds account for more than 20 percent of externally managed assets 
and more than 50 percent for DC assets. Lastly, in the UK, the top three asset managers hold more 
than 70 percent of externally managed retirement assets. This is important since fragmented 
retirement systems leave more authority in the hands of service providers, including investment 
managers and consultants.  
Table 3 here 
In situations where retirement plans use external managers to run segregated mandates on 
their behalf, plan sponsors can retain a high degree of control over both the shape of the portfolio 
and the opportunities for engagement associated with these investments. However, retirement 
plans that invest through pooled funds are usually unable to exercise their ownership rights, and 
many of the bigger asset managers have poor track records on proxy voting and other aspects of 
stewardship. Recent research has found that the three biggest passive asset managers globally have 
stewardship budgets that are only 0.2 percent of the estimated fees they earn from managing equity 
assets, and that there is no real incentive for them to dedicate more resources to stewardship 
activities (Bebchuk and Hirst 2019). In addition to limited stewardship activities, there is also 
evidence on poor voting records on sustainability issues, and significant variation between the 
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largest asset managers (InfluenceMap 2019; ShareAction 2019). In a private retirement system 
where the majority of savers increasingly invest through passive funds, this is becoming a major 
concern. Notably, Australian super funds—which have more actively managed investments—are 
insourcing a growing proportion of their asset management, while at the same time, they are 
increasingly adopting sustainable investment activities and undertaking stewardship of their assets. 
A few larger plans in the UK and US—mainly public plans—with internal investment teams and 
sufficient resources are also adopting this model. While this potentially addresses the sustainability 
shortcomings of service providers for sizable public plans, such an option may not be available to 
smaller retirement plans lacking internal investment expertise. 
Australia, the UK, and the US represent more than half of the total private retirement assets 
globally. Given that all three markets rely heavily on the fund management industry, the practices 
of the largest firms are vital determinants of the sustainability practices of private retirement 
systems. The investment consultant market is similarly dominated by a small number of firms. For 
instance, in the US, the top 10 consulting firms account for 80 percent of institutional, tax-exempt 
assets under advice ($24 trillion) and the top 20 for over 90 percent. In the UK, two firms (Mercer 
and Aon/WTW)5 have an estimated combined market share of 40 percent. In Australia, four 
consulting firms dominate the industry. In essence, a few international firms hold significant 
market shares and therefore they can exert influence on the extent to which retirement plans 
consider sustainability issues.  
Moreover, investment consultants are instrumental in determining the degree of 
sustainability embedded in the investment strategies of the retirement plans they advise (PRI 
2017a). They provide a range of advisory services ranging from funding, to asset allocation, 
manager selection, platform recommendations, fund options, and reporting processes. They 
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frequently train sponsors and trustees on approaches to investment and emerging investment 
trends, and they are generally a recognised source of authority and knowledge. The influence of 
consultants is especially marked in the OCIO and fiduciary management markets, which are 
relatively small but are the fastest-growing areas for consulting services. Therefore, investment 
consultants are already key actors in facilitating the sustainability of private retirement systems, 
and their continued expansion in services will only further emphasise their importance. 
We also note that the UK Competition and Market Authority found that, although 
retirement plans accounted for 90 percent of consultants’ revenues, most trustees did not engage 
with them. In addition, consultants usually do not include new investment strategies in their watch 
lists until these have built a three-year track record, and we have learned that there are still 
relatively few sustainable investment funds that meet this threshold. This has been a particular 
barrier for the adoption of new TDFs focusing on sustainability by US 401(k) plans. The 
investment consulting sector—despite pockets of excellence—has also generally failed to 
incorporate ESG considerations into standard advice templates (PRI 2017b). The market power, 
resources and influence of asset managers, investment consultants, and other service providers 
imply that they are often better placed than retirement plan sponsors to drive responsible 
investment and stewardship, yet to date there are few incentives to do so. Overall, their lack of 
incentives in practice—which are driven mainly by offering low-cost products and services in 
competitive markets—lead to limited execution. We find that legal and regulatory frameworks 
focused on reducing costs—for example, the UK charge cap and class action suits in the US—are 
important measures to protect savers from high costs and fees in fragmented retirement systems. 
Nevertheless, they are also very likely to contribute to the lack of incentives on sustainability. We 
find this to be a key structural challenge, which may undermine long-term system sustainability.  
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Principal-Agent Conflicts in Personal Pensions. Next, we examine the role of principal-agent 
conflicts in personal pensions and how it contributes to private retirement system sustainability. 
To this end, we again examine the 2019 data from national retirement and pension agencies, 
regulators and industry associations cited previously. Nevertheless, there are limited data available 
on service providers, market shares, and investment products, which makes it difficult to judge 
some aspects of the market. Personal pensions constitute a large and growing share of private 
retirement systems in all three countries. In Table 1, we showed that IRAs in the US account for 
36.7 percent of total US retirement system assets. In Australia, self-managed super funds account 
for 25.5 percent, and personal pension assets in the UK account for 17 percent.  
We conclude that individual savers in personal pensions tend not to have the same level of 
access to portfolio data as do institutional clients. Furthermore, many lack the time and resources 
to digest and analyse vast amounts of information, and large numbers will be insufficiently 
educated to make complex financial decisions. As a result, many rely on their independent 
financial advisers (IFAs), which is a fragmented market consisting of thousands of firms. In 
addition, current regulatory regimes raise concerns over levels of consumer protection. For 
example, most IFAs in the US are not fiduciaries and operate under a lesser ‘suitability’ standard. 
Personal pension savers are product-takers—to an even higher extent than 401(k) plans—with 
little leverage relative to service providers from the concentrated fund management industry. 
Consequently, participants are disengaged from the process of choosing their product, provider, 
and investments. Cost, which is often a more comprehensible metric than value or quality, is often 
the focus guiding peoples’ decisions. For this reason, sustainability is often not considered as an 
asset feature, so providers have limited commercial incentives to introduce and promote new 
sustainable products and services. As a result, more than $12 trillion of personal pension savings 
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are being managed across three countries with minimal stewardship and consideration of 
sustainability issues.  
 
Conclusions and Implications 
The aim of this study was to understand the policy frameworks and important structural 
variables—fund concentration, number and types of actors, and relative market power—within the 
private retirement systems in Australia, the UK, and the US. By reviewing policy and structure, 
we sought to better understand the behaviour of various actors, their key challenges, how 
retirement systems function, and their ability to align with sustainability objectives. We also 
identified key challenges for specific national retirement systems and analysed comparative 
aspects in relation to policy and regulation, structure, governance, and the role of service providers. 
This, in turn, afforded us with new insights into how, or whether, specific system designs facilitate 
sustainable investments.  
We identified three key issues: 1) the issue of market fragmentation, which tends to 
undermine the responsible investment support and activities among retirement plans; 2) the 
increasing importance of fund managers and investment consultants, along with their limited 
sustainable investment incentives; and 3) the growth and lack of a sustainability emphasis in 
personal pension systems.  
While regulators in many parts of the world seek more sophisticated policies to align the 
financial system and economies with sustainability objectives, we conclude that one should not 
overlook the need to devote equal attention to retirement system structure, in ways to align these 
with sustainability policies. Furthermore, policymakers should consider fund consolidation in 
private sector retirement systems. The presence of well-governed, influential retirement plans with 
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cross-sectoral ownership of the economy and a universal ownership outlook and their relative 
weight in the financial system is key to counter collective action problems and drive how systemic 
sustainability issues are addressed by other actors. Fund consolidation may be achieved, for 
example, by raising the professional standards of trustees and fiduciaries or through introduction 
of new ESG-related obligations on pension funds (such as Taskforce for Climate-related Financial 
Disclosure by UK pension funds). Given the right regulatory options, as we’ve seen with UK 
master trusts and the Australian superannuation structure, this forces smaller pension funds (often 
single employer) which do not comply with new standards to consider letting assets being absorbed 
under available multi-employer alternatives. Fortunately, the emergence of environmental 
taxonomies will provide us with information about the extent to which various retirement plans 
perform relative to national goals. This has the potential to further our understanding on the 
relationship between structure, governance and sustainability performance and thereby better 
refine our policy recommendations in the future. 
We also find room for concern, in that smaller retirement plans are less likely to consider 
responsible investment practices, while commercial service providers lack incentives to deviate 
from the ‘norm.’ Policymakers should therefore consider whether service-provider incentives 
should be aligned with sustainability incentives. Our findings also emphasize that it remains an 
open question as to whether beneficiary sustainability interests are truly being met and serviced. 
We therefore suggest that policymakers could do much to boost transparency in these markets, 
helping generate better-informed policies and provide beneficiaries with information relevant to 
their savings choices.  
There remains much more to do to improve our understanding by analysing how ESG is 
being integrated and adopted across the board. In the future, it would be useful to study the proxy 
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voting behaviour of various actors including retirement plans (public and private), providers of 
personal pension products, and third-party managers. In a similar spirit, analysing ‘sustainable’ 
capital flows at the aggregate level would be useful as well. Furthermore, we identified other future 
research opportunities in personal pension markets including investigating asset concentration, 
market shares by various actors and sustainable product uptake. Lastly, our study concentrated on 
identifying structural characteristics of three main jurisdictions. We suggest that additional major 
retirement systems in terms of assets be analyzed, including Canada, Denmark, Japan, the 
Netherlands, and Sweden, as they are likely to face different structural challenges. By analysing 
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1 We use the OECD term ‘private retirement system’ which includes retirement plans and pension 
schemes that are not part of the social security or other statutory pension programme administered 
by the government—private pension schemes and retirement plans may be administered directly 
by an employer acting as the plan sponsor, by a private sector pension provider or other financial 
institution. 
2 PRI membership is a commitment to implement the six principles, including ESG 
incorporation, active ownership, and the annual public disclosure of information to document 
progress; this also entails a requirement to meet certain minimum requirements related to 
governance and implementation. 
3 Data from the UK pension authorities do not allow the separation of DB and DC trust-based 
workplace assets to determine PRI signatory coverage. 
4 Most new members of private sector workplace DC plans are automatically enrolled into the 
default option, which is likely to be a Target Date Fund (TDF) or other balanced strategy; 21% of 
401(k) assets are in TDFs, rising to 49% of the assets of recently hired participants in their 20s. 








Note: Sponsors of private DB plans in the US routinely establish governing bodies that take on 
responsibility for managing and administering the plans. The governing body is comprised of plan 
fiduciaries who typically are corporate officers. The fiduciaries are the ultimate stewards of the 
assets and of beneficiaries’ interests. The sponsor remains ultimately responsible for making up 
any shortfall in the plan’s funding, so it has a continuing interest in the investment strategy. This 
dual role of fiduciaries and potential absence of impartiality influences the governance model. The 
figure also reveals a complex structure of advisors (actuaries and consultants), administrators, and 
asset managers. The investment chain has multiple entities involved in both investment strategy 
and execution and the structure and governance setup leave US private sector DB plans with 
limited influence on the complex intermediation chain. 
 
Source: PRI (2020b).   
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Note: Sponsors in of private DB retirement plans in the UK routinely establish governing bodies 
that take on responsibility for managing and administering the plans. The governing body is 
comprised of independent trustees required to act impartially and in members’ best interests. 
Trustees are the ultimate stewards of the assets and of beneficiaries’ interests. The sponsor remains 
ultimately responsible for making up any shortfall in the plan’s funding, so it has a continuing 
interest in the investment strategy. Trustees have the final say on investments. The investment 
chain has multiple entities involved in both investment strategy and execution, and the structure 
and governance setup leave private sector DB plans in the UK with limited influence on the 
complex intermediation chain. 
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Note: The value chain of US 401(k) plans also includes a long chain of intermediaries between the ultimate owner of the invested assets 
of a 401(k) plan—the employee—and the actual investment decision. Plan sponsors are ultimately responsible for the design and 
operation of the plan. They usually use third-party trustees and recordkeepers for day-to-day operations, relying on external advisers in 
choosing the provider and determining the investment line-up. As plan participants are increasingly enrolled into a default option, termed 

























manager’s selection of underlying instruments—will be the primary determinant of how DC assets are invested. The complex 
intermediation chain increases the risk of beneficiary or plan preferences on sustainability not being expressed it investment decisions 
or proxy voting behaviour.  
 





Table 1. Asset concentration, growth trends, and PRI coverage within workplace retirement and 
personal pension systems 
   
Assets 
$bn 








US independent retirement accounts 11,025 N/A N/A 8.6% n/a 
US public employees DB 6,730 190 35.42 5.3% 27% 
US 401(k) 6,200 560,00 0.01 7.1% <1% 
US private sector workplace DB 3,380 46,500 0.07 2.4% 0% 
UK private sector workplace DB 2,125 5,500 0.39 7.7% 18%* 
Australia not-for-profit super funds 895 74 12.09 11.7% 75% 
UK personal pensions 620 N/A N/A N/A n/a 
Australia self-managed super funds 515 N/A N/A 5.1% n/a 
UK local government pension 
schemes 
450 20 22.50 9.8% 66% 
Australia retail super funds 430 112 3.84 3.1% 45% 
UK workplace DC contract 240 12** 19.58 N/A N/A 
UK workplace DC trust 95 2,000 0.05 17.9%*** 18%* 
* UK data does not allow the separation of DB and DC trust-based workplace assets. 
** 12 private pension providers cover more than 2,000 company schemes. 
*** Excludes micro schemes. 
 
Note: Personal pensions—such as independent retirement accounts and self-managed super funds 
—exhibit relatively high 5-year compound annual growth rates (CAGR) and are highly 
fragmented. The public sector retirement assets are significantly more concentrated across the 
three countries than private sector retirement assets with the exception of the UK workplace DC 
contract segment (this is due to a distinct feature of asset pooling of company schemes). 
Fragmented segments of retirement systems—i.e., exhibiting lower average plan size in asset 
terms—are less engaged on responsible investment than segments with concentration of assets 
using PRI membership as an indicator. Membership of the PRI entails a commitment to implement 
six principles, including ESG incorporation, active ownership, and the annual public disclosure of 
information to document progress; this also includes a requirement to meet certain minimum 
requirements related to governance and implementation. There are no institutional entities in the 
personal pension system eligible for PRI asset owner membership. 
 





Table 2. Country-by-country overview of private retirement assets, PRI coverage and DB/DC shares 
  






























Australia 1,945 1,430 515 47.1% 64% 14% 86% 
UK 3,650 3,030 620 19.5% 23.5% 70% 30% 
US 27,570 17,860 9,720 8.1% 12.5% 53% 47% 
Exchange rates used: $1= A$1.45, $1= £0.76 
 
Note: The US private retirement system with a total of more than $27trn in assets dwarfs those of Australia ($1.95trn) and the UK 
($3.65trn). The PRI’s signatory base covers nearly 50% of the assets in the Australian retirement system and over 60% of workplace 
retirement savings. In the UK, the figures are 19.5% and 23.5% respectively. In the US, PRI signatories hold only 8% of system assets 
and 13% of workplace retirement assets. Just over half of the total workplace assets across these three countries are held in DB plans. 
The general trend from DB to DC is all but complete in Australia, with only a handful of super funds offering purely DB plans and is 
gathering pace in the UK and the US. In both the UK and the US, public sector workplace retirement provision remains primarily DB. 
The private retirement systems include retirement plans and pension schemes that are not part of the social security or other statutory 
pension programme administered by the government. This can either be: 1) workplace plans which are linked to an employment 
or professional relationship between the plan member and the plan sponsor and are established by employers or groups thereof (e.g. 
industry associations) and labour or professional associations, jointly or separately, or 2) personal pensions which are established and 
administered directly by a pension fund or other financial institution without intervention by employers and where individuals 
independently purchase and select material aspects of the arrangements while employers may make contributions.  
 





Table 3. Asset concentration of outsourced private retirement assets by top asset management 
firms per country 
* Not PRI signatories 
 
Note: The asset management industry‘s assets under management have continued to rise steadily 
over the past ten years, with US firms leading the pack. US asset managers also have the largest 
market share across the three private retirement systems examined. In Australia the 10 largest asset 
managers hold more than 50% of outsourced retirement assets. The UK retirement asset 
management market is extremely concentrated, with the top three providers managing over 70% 
of total outsourced assets under management. In the US, the top 10 asset managers for DB plans 
are responsible for over 20% of outsourced DB assets and the top 10 managers for DC plans for 
nearly 50% of outsourced DC assets.  
 
Sources: P&I The Largest Money Managers (2019), IPE (2019), Australian Managed Funds 
industry, FSC/Morningstar (2016), PRI signatory database (2020). 
  
 Market concentration of externally 
managed retirement assets 
Largest asset managers 





Macquarie Bank Group 
BlackRock 
Schroder Investment Management 
UBS Asset Management 
BT Investment Management 
UK Top 3 asset managers > 70% of assets Legal and General Investment Management 
Insight 
Blackrock 
US Top 10 asset managers for DB have 








State Street Global Advisors 
Prudential Financial 
JP Morgan AM 
Northern Trust 
Top 10 asset managers for DC have 
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